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INVESTING IN WORK: WILKES AS AN
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE
 
DEBORAH A. DEMOTT* 
INTRODUCTION 
The plaintiff’s situation in Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, 
Inc.1 warrants a fresh look in light of recent scholarship that focuses 
on default rules, in particular the presumption that an employment 
contract for an indefinite term creates a relationship of employment 
at-will.2  This focus furnishes a new vantage point from which to 
assess the court’s holding in Wilkes, both in isolation and in contrast 
with subsequent cases. The Wilkes court required a controlling 
shareholder (whether a single shareholder or an alliance among 
several) to demonstrate that a legitimate business purpose justified 
terminating the employment of a shareholder in a closely-held cor­
poration in which economic return on equity came only through 
salary payments, subject to a showing by the discharged employee-
shareholder that through means less injurious to him the corpora­
tion could have achieved the same business objective.3  If the con­
trolling shareholder cannot show a legitimate business purpose for 
its action—or, having established such a purpose the shareholder-
employee shows the availability of an alternative less injurious than 
termination—the termination breaches the controlling shareholder 
or shareholders’ fiduciary duty to the discharged shareholder-em­
ployee.4  Otherwise, or more generally, an employment of indefi­
nite duration (like the plaintiff’s in Wilkes) is subject to a 
* David F. Cavers Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. Thanks to 
Mitu Gulati for comments on a prior draft of this article and to Symposium participants 
for their reactions and questions. 
1. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 657-61 (Mass. 1976). 
2. On default rules generally, see Brett McDonnell, Sticky Defaults and Altering 
Rules in Corporate Law, 60 SMU L. Rev. 383, 393-97 (2007) (summarizing literature). 
For discussion of scholarship analyzing the employment at-will doctrine as a default 
rule, see infra text accompanying notes 65-78. R 
3. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 663-64. 
4. Id. at 663. 
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presumption that the relationship is one at-will; either party may 
terminate at any time for any reason or for no reason.5 
The presumption of employment at-will fits neatly into the cat­
egory of legal rules that are defaults, that is, rules the parties may 
change by agreeing to an alternate term.  Intriguingly, employment 
at-will may also fit into the sub-category of default rules that are 
“sticky” because either the law makes changing away from the de­
fault relatively difficult or, separate from hurdles formally imposed 
by the law, parties’ agreements in fact rarely shift away from the 
default when doing so would have been optimal for the parties. 
Why the latter might be so—a default rule remains unchanged for 
reasons unrelated to legally-imposed obstacles to deter change— 
has attracted diverse explanations at the level of theory. These in­
clude the direct costs of drafting to oust an otherwise-applicable 
default rule; cognitive biases, which may stem from misunderstand­
ing the substance of the default rule; and the deterrent effects of 
anticipating other parties’ reactions to proposing an alternative to 
the default.6 
One might characterize Wilkes and subsequent cases in Massa­
chusetts and other jurisdictions as ousting the default rule of em­
ployment at-will and replacing it with a different default rule that, 
at least in Massachusetts, contains an irreducible core of mandatory 
law.  This substitution makes sense to the extent employment at-
will in Wilkes and comparable settings represents a sticky default, 
not an optimal rule chosen by the parties as a considered regime to 
govern their relationship over time as founding investor-sharehold­
ers.  Data on the extent to which parties to employment agreements 
do or do not replace the at-will default with an alternate term bear 
on this question.  As it happens, although most non-union employ­
ment contracts in the United States appear either not to depart 
from the at-will default or to adopt it explicitly, in one employment 
setting—CEOs of the largest public corporations—the default is al­
most invariably replaced by provisions imposing adverse financial 
consequences on a party who terminates employment without hav­
ing good cause to do so.7 
5. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  EMP’T  LAW § 2.01 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2009). 
6. See text infra accompanying notes 99-120. R 
7. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO 
Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 231, 246-48 (2006). 
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This Article begins by introducing the doctrine of employment 
at-will and its contemporary operation, and applying the doctrine to 
the facts in Wilkes.  The point of the exercise is making clear the 
impact of Wilkes from the standpoint of employment law. The Ar­
ticle next turns to scholarship examining the at-will rule as a default 
rule and the circumstances under which a default rule may become 
sticky.  Against this background, the Article concludes by reexam­
ining the holding in Wilkes along with subsequent developments in 
Massachusetts and other jurisdictions.  These include the implica­
tions of buy-sell and comparable provisions in shareholder agree­
ments.  In the situations to which the Wilkes doctrine applies in 
Massachusetts and elsewhere, at-will is more likely to be a sticky 
default than in many other employment relationships.  Several fac­
tors contribute to this conclusion, perhaps most strongly the impon­
derable (or un-pondered) question of how effective control over 
the corporation’s decision-making may shift in the future. 
I. EMPLOYMENT AT-WILL 
A. Terminating an Employee for “Bad Reasons” 
In forty-nine states and the District of Columbia, in the ab­
sence of an agreement otherwise, employment is an at-will relation­
ship that either party may terminate at any time with or without 
cause.8  Over the past seventy years, exceptions have softened the 
severity with which the at-will rule operates.  In the assessment of a 
leading scholar of employment law, these exceptions “virtually 
decimate[ ]” an employer’s right to fire for “bad reasons,” with the 
consequence that the baseline default rule “now co-exists with nu­
merous important exceptions—statutory and common law, state 
and federal—that prohibit the discharge of employees for particular 
bad reasons.”9  The so-called “bad reasons” exceptions generally 
support interests that extend beyond any particular employee to 
further public interests more generally. Thus, an employer acts 
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF  EMP’T  LAW § 2.01.  The exception is Montana, in 
which the Wrongful Discharge of Employment Act requires that an employer show 
“good cause” to terminate any employee who has completed a probationary period. 
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 39-2-901 to -914 (2009).  No state to date has adopted the Model 
Employment Termination Act, approved in 1991 by the National Conference of Com­
missioners on Uniform State Laws. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.01 cmt. 
a; Model Employment Termination Act: Adoption Status Map, NAT’L  CONF. OF  COM­
MISSIONERS ON  UNIFORM  STATE  LAWS, http://www.nccusl.org/Act.aspx?title=Model% 
20Employment%20Termination%20Act (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
9. Cynthia L. Estlund, Wrongful Discharge Protections in an At-Will World, 74 
TEX. L. REV. 1655, 1655 (1996). 
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with a “bad reason” when it discharges an employee on the basis of 
a status such as race, sex, or religion; or retaliates against an em­
ployee who refused to commit a crime, exercised a clear legal right 
such as filing a worker’s compensation claim for job-related inju­
ries, or performed a legal duty such as serving on a jury.10  How 
broadly or narrowly the common law exceptions are formulated 
varies across jurisdictions, but their gist seems well-established in 
most.11 
Were these exceptions to the employment at-will rule the sole 
source of law to which Wilkes and his counsel might have looked 
for relief, he would not have had a claim against his former em­
ployer, the closely-held corporation Springside Nursing Home, Inc. 
Based on the court’s recitation of the events that preceded Wilkes’s 
termination as a salaried officer, at worst the termination stemmed 
from a fellow shareholder’s quest for revenge.12  Wilkes objected to 
the price at which another shareholder, Quinn, proposed to buy 
property from the corporation and persuaded the other two share­
holders to demand a higher price than Quinn “apparently antici­
pated paying or desired to pay.”13  Thereafter the Quinn-Wilkes 
relationship deteriorated to one of “bad blood” that also “affected 
the attitudes of” the other two shareholders toward Wilkes.14 
Wilkes notified the others of his intention to sell his shares at a 
price based on their appraised value—apparently shareholders in 
Springside had not agreed on any mechanism for the remaining 
shareholders or the corporation to buy out the shares of a share­
holder who wished to exit—and, at the next directors’ meeting, 
Wilkes was left off the list of recipients of salaries but Quinn re­
ceived a raise.15  Up to that time, all four shareholders received sal­
aries in equal amounts, which increased over time as the business 
10. Id. at 1659, 1661. 
11. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 4.01 cmt. a (noting that “[a] con­
sensus has emerged in recent decades that recognizes a cause of action in tort for 
wrongful discharge in violation of public policy”). 
12. The other shareholders also chose not to re-elect Wilkes as a director. See 
Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 661 (Mass. 1976).  A person 
is not an employee of a corporation solely because the person serves as a director. See 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 1.01 cmt. f(2) (2006) (stating that directors hold 
original undelegated powers that stem from their election to office, not delegation from 
shareholders; “[a] director may, of course, also be an employee or an officer (who may 
or may not be an employee) of the corporation, giving the director an additional and 
separate conventional position or role as an agent”). 
13. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 660. 
14. Id. 
15. Id. at 660-61. 
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became profitable.16  Each shareholder had an assigned area of 
functional responsibility (maintenance of the nursing home’s build­
ing and grounds for Wilkes).17  Two months later, at a shareholder’s 
meeting, Wilkes was not re-elected as a director or officer, and 
“[h]e was further informed that neither his services nor his presence 
at the nursing home was wanted by his associates.”18 
Thus, Wilkes’s employer, the corporation, likely terminated his 
employment in a culmination of ill-will toward him that originated 
from his dispute with one fellow shareholder, grew when he an­
nounced his wish to sell his shares, and then became more genera­
lized.  These circumstances are far from the factual underpinnings 
of “bad reasons” exceptions to employment at-will. For starters, in 
a four-owner corporation in which all shareholders also work as 
employees, animosity toward one shareholder-employee may so 
destabilize business operations and decision-making that it could 
constitute a good (or at least neutral) reason for termination.  Addi­
tionally, his fellow shareholders’ animosity toward Wilkes was un­
complicated by any public interest comparable to those justifying 
the “bad reasons” exceptions to an employer’s right to fire an em­
ployee at-will.19 
B. Overcoming the Presumption of Employment at-Will 
As a default rule, employment at-will is inapplicable if em­
ployee and employer agree otherwise, for example by providing 
that the employment will be for a definite term or, if for an indefi­
nite term, that only with cause may the employment be termi­
nated.20  The shareholders in Wilkes had no explicit employment 
agreements with Springside.21  Although the court’s opinion 
stresses a “long-standing policy” that employment by the corpora­
tion (and a directorship) “would go hand in hand with stock owner­
ship”22 and notes that “[a] guaranty of employment”23 is a 
fundamental reason for investing in a closely-held corporation, the 
16. Id. at 660. 
17. Id. at 660 n.8. 
18. Id. at 661. 
19. Accord King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 493 (Mass. 1994) (holding that ter­
mination of employment because shareholder participated in derivative suit was not 
wrongful because underlying dispute concerned only corporation, not broader public 
interests). 
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 2009). 
21. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 661. 
22. Id. at 664. 
23. Id. at 662. 
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Wilkes shareholders did not formalize or explicitly articulate either 
the policy or a guaranty of employment.  A softer norm or practice 
of continued employment is not an agreement that suffices to over­
come the presumption of at-will employment.  Indeed, the gap be­
tween norms that operate informally within an organization and a 
legally-enforceable agreement that ousts the operation of the at-will 
rule is well known to judges, legal scholars, and practitioners.24 
Distinct from a bilateral agreement departing from the rule of 
at-will employment, in many jurisdictions the at-will presumption 
may be overcome by an employer’s promise to limit termination, 
thus inducing detrimental reliance by an employee.25  In Massachu­
setts, such a promise must embody a “[p]articularly explicit expres­
sion[ ] of intent” on the part of the employer to bind it to an 
employment “contract of extraordinary duration,” that is, any dura­
tion other than one at-will.26  It is not evident whether the “long-
standing policy” to which the Wilkes court referred27 had the requi­
site specificity because the opinion does not detail either the pol­
icy’s terms or how it was documented or otherwise expressed. 
Likewise, in many jurisdictions (including Massachusetts) a 
policy statement unilaterally made by an employer—typically in a 
manual or other document distributed to employees—may also cre­
ate an enforceable variation away from the rule of at-will employ­
24. On the difference between informal norms in internal labor markets and le­
gally effective agreements, see Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, The Enforce­
ability of Norms and the Employment Relationship, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1913, 1917 
(1996) (observing that “[i]n non-union workplaces, a clear norm exists that an employer 
will not discharge an employee without cause”). Rock and Wachter argue that courts 
generally should not enforce such norms because formal legal enforcement would not 
usefully add to self-enforcement. Id. at 1917-20.  This argument has been criticized 
because it ignores the possibility “that the absence of formal agreements may reflect 
serious contracting problems, rather than a state of efficient contracting.” Walter 
Kamiat, Labor and Lemons: Efficient Norms in the Internal Labor Market and the Pos­
sible Failures of Individual Contracting, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1953, 1954 (1996). 
25. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.02(b).  In some states, promis­
sory estoppel is not an available basis upon which to counter the presumption of em­
ployment at-will. See City of Midland v. O’Bryant, 18 S.W.3d 209, 215 (Tex. 2000). In 
some states, the statute of frauds may also preclude the use of promissory estoppel 
when the employer’s promise was not memorialized in writing. See McInerney v. Char­
ter Golf, Inc., 680 N.E.2d 1347, 1352 (Ill. 1997). 
26. See Sioufi v. Youville Rehabilitation & Chronic Disease Hosp., No. 
CA9204003, 1994 WL 879990, at *2 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 27, 1994) (holding that a 
letter from an employer containing job offer with no expressly stated duration for em­
ployment was insufficiently definite expression of intent). 
27. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664. 
6
Western New England Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/10
 503 
\\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE209.txt unknown Seq: 7 11-AUG-11 15:54 
2011] WILKES AS AN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE 
ment.28  Some courts treat such unilateral employer statements as 
instances of unilateral contracts;29 others apply general estoppel 
principles.30  In Wilkes, Springside may not have formalized or doc­
umented its employment policies—for non-shareholder employees 
as well as its shareholder-employees—as would an employer with a 
larger work force and the corresponding need “to deal[ ] with a 
large number of similarly situated employees” and “communicate 
the terms of the employment relationship” throughout its 
workforce or specific segments of it.31 
C. Economic Good Faith32 
If an employer discharges an employee to evade its obligation 
to pay compensation for already-completed services or to prevent 
vesting or accrual of employee rights and benefits, the employer 
breaches the contractual implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing.33  Although some jurisdictions do not recognize this appli­
cation of the covenant,34 Massachusetts was early to adopt it in, as it 
happens, a case decided one year after Wilkes.  In Fortune v. Na­
tional Cash Register Co., the employer discharged the plaintiff, a 
salesman whose contract assured him of bonuses as commissions 
based on the price of products he sold within his geographic sales 
territory.35  The contract also made explicit that the plaintiff’s em­
ployment was at-will.36  Under the contract, 75% of the bonus 
amount was payable to the plaintiff if the territory was assigned to 
28. See O’Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 847 (Mass. 1996) 
(stating that personnel manual may impose obligations on employer); RESTATEMENT 
(THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.04. 
29. See, e.g., O’Brien, 664 N.E.2d at 848. 
30. See, e.g., Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880, 908 (Mich. 
1980). 
31. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.04 cmt. a. 
32. I owe this terminology to J. Hoult Verkerke, An Empirical Perspective on 
Indefinite Term Employment Contracts: The Just Cause Debate, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 837, 
844 (1995). 
33. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06(c). 
34. See, e.g., Morriss v. Coleman Co., 738 P.2d 841, 851 (Kan. 1987); Sanchez v. 
The New Mexican, 738 P.2d 1321, 1324 (N.M. 1987); cf. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 
506 N.E.2d 919, 922 (N.Y. 1987) (“‘[N]o obligation can be implied . . . which would be 
inconsistent with other terms of the contractual relationship in which the law accords 
the employer an unfettered right to terminate employment at any time.’” (quoting 
Murphy v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 448 N.E.2d 86, 91 (N.Y. 1983))). For a limited 
application of the covenant in New York, see Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 110 
(N.Y. 1992) (holding that covenant was violated when law firm discharged associate 
attorney for action taken in compliance with rules applicable to the legal profession). 
35. Fortune v. Nat’l Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251, 1253-54 (Mass. 1976). 
36. Id. at 1253. 
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him at the time the products were delivered to the customer; 100% 
if the territory was assigned to the plaintiff at the times of both 
delivery and installation of the products; and no bonus was payable 
under some circumstances on products shipped after eighteen 
months from the date of their sale.37  Two months after the plaintiff 
was credited with a $5 million sale of equipment,38 the plaintiff re­
ceived a notice terminating his employment but was told to “‘stay 
on’” in a support position.39  The employer eventually paid the 
plaintiff 75% of the bonus due, paying the remaining 25% to an­
other employee who helped to install the equipment.40  The court 
held that the employer breached the implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing through its termination of the plaintiff although the 
employer complied with the contract’s explicit terms.41  In the 
court’s assessment, the employer overreached, attempting to de­
prive the plaintiff of a portion of a commission due him, acting 
analogously to a “principal [who] seeks to deprive [an] agent of all 
compensation [due the agent] by terminating the contractual rela­
tionship when the agent is on the brink of successfully completing 
[a] sale.”42 
Thus, under Fortune, as in cases in which an employee is dis­
charged for a “bad reason,” the employer’s motivation determines 
whether the termination is wrongful.43  However, when breached, 
the Fortune standard and its counterparts in other states support a 
37. Id. 
38. Under the terms of the contract, the sale entitled him to a bonus of 
$92,079.99. Id. at 1254. 
39. Id. (quoting the termination notice). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. at 1255. 
42. Id. at 1257.  A prominent academic defender of the at-will rule criticized the 
holding in Fortune as “wrong in principle.” Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Con­
tract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 981 (1984).  Professor Epstein characterized the 
contract’s structure of commission payments as “represent[ing] a rough effort to match 
payment with performance where the labor of more than one individual was necessary 
to close the sale,” and “not simply one where a strategically timed firing allowed the 
company to deprive a dismissed employee of the benefits due him on completion of 
performance,” noting that the company itself “kept none of the commission at all.” Id. 
This critique ignores Fortune’s entitlement to 100% of the commission had the pur­
chaser been within his territory at the times of both delivery and installation, regardless 
of whether installing the equipment required the assistance of others. 
43. New York, which does not recognize the tort of employer discipline or dis­
charge in violation of public policy, recognizes that a discharge may be the basis for a 
claim of breach of an implied-in-law obligation of good faith and fair dealing. See 
Wieder v. Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105, 108 (N.Y. 1992) (recognizing implied-in-law contract 
claim where law firm discharged associate attorney after associate insisted firm comply 
with code of professional responsibility applicable to lawyers). 
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claim for breach of contract, not a tort claim or a Wilkes claim for 
breach of fiduciary duty.44  Nonetheless, Wilkes and Fortune are 
doctrinally complementary.  To be sure, the underlying structure of 
the parties’ relationships in Wilkes did not utilize performance trig­
gers for economic rewards or other arrangements comparable to 
the payment of sales commissions or bonuses.  But the two plain­
tiffs’ situations were not so dissimilar.  Like the plaintiff in Fortune, 
Wilkes would receive the full benefit of his investment and involve­
ment to date in Springside only so long as he remained a salaried 
employee.45  Although, as suggested above, the reasons behind the 
termination of Wilkes’s employment were not “bad reasons” for 
employment-law purposes, the court’s holding requires a motive-
related showing of “legitimate business purpose” to justify depriv­
ing the plaintiff of the continuing condition—employment—requi­
site to receiving economic returns from the corporation.46  On the 
other hand, under the Wilkes standard, an employee-shareholder’s 
entitlement to continued employment lacks the absolute and un­
conditional character of a successful contract claim under Fortune. 
D. Parties and Claims 
Underlying structural features also distinguish claims for 
breach of fiduciary duty from claims based on the employment-law 
doctrines described above.  Employment law presupposes a rela­
tionship structured between two parties—employer and em­
ployee—who owe each other rights and duties.  In Wilkes, in 
contrast, the employer’s identity was in practical terms fluid over 
time because Springside’s governance encompassed the plaintiff as 
a director and officer up to the rupture of his relationships with his 
fellow shareholders.  Thus, employment law’s assumed separation 
between employer and employee becomes clouded when the em­
ployee in question is himself part of the employer-entity’s central 
organs of governance and decision-making.  Indeed, in portions of 
employment law outside the scope of this Article, shareholder-di­
rectors who are not mere employees are ineligible for statutory pro­
tections applicable only to “employees.”47 
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF EMP’T LAW § 2.06 cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 2, 
2009). 
45. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 664 (Mass. 1976). 
46. Id. at 663. 
47. Many such disputes involve professional firms. See, e.g., Clackamas Gastro­
enterology Assocs. v. Wells, 538 U.S. 440, 449-50 (2003) (articulating test for determin­
9
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As a consequence, claims governed by Wilkes differ from the 
employment-law claims discussed above.  In Wilkes, although Spr­
ingside was a named defendant, the judgment ran against the plain­
tiff’s fellow shareholders (or their estates), not Springside itself.48 
That is, the court held that the other shareholders breached their 
fiduciary duties to Wilkes, not that Wilkes’s termination breached a 
duty owed him by the corporation itself.49  In contrast, typical em­
ployment-law claims focus on whether the employer itself breached 
its duties to an employee, while any judgment runs against the 
corporation. 
However, other claims asserted in more typical employment-
law cases are similar to those governed by Wilkes. Plaintiffs in 
wrongful-termination cases often allege separate claims against su­
pervisors and other co-employees responsible for the termination, 
alleging intentional and wrongful interference with the plaintiff’s 
contractual relations with the corporation.50  Many courts have held 
that this cause of action may be based on an at-will contract.51  If 
successful, the plaintiff has a claim against individual actors within 
the employer’s organization whose conduct led to the plaintiff’s dis­
charge by their common employer, comparable to Wilkes’s claim 
against his former fellow shareholders.  To be sure, the elements 
that comprise the tort of wrongful interference are not identical to 
the components of breach of fiduciary duty.  In particular, the tort 
of wrongful interference requires showing that the defendant acted 
with an improper motive or used improper means to effect the in­
terference,52 while breach of fiduciary duty does not require show­
ing whether individual is an “employee” for purposes of applicability of federal 
Americans with Disabilities Act and similar statutes administered by EEOC). 
48. Wilkes, 353 N.E.2d at 664-65. 
49. Id. at 663-65; see also Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 352 n.2 
(Mass. 1996) (holding that former shareholder-employee’s claim of breach of fiduciary 
duty ran against corporation’s controlling shareholder, not corporation). 
50. For a Massachusetts example of a tortious interference claim against a co­
employee, see O’Brien v. New Eng. Tel. & Tel. Co., 664 N.E.2d 843, 845-46 (Mass. 
1996). 
51. See, e.g., Finley v. Giacobbe, 79 F.3d 1285, 1295 (2d Cir. 1996) (applying New 
York law). But cf. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1313-14 (N.Y. 
1989) (cautioning that “plaintiff [must not] be allowed to evade the employment at-will 
rule and relationship by recasting his cause of action in the garb of a tortious interfer­
ence with his employment”). 
52. The Restatement definition of the cause of action for tortious interference 
with contract is: 
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a 
contract (except a contract to marry) between another and a third person by 
inducing or otherwise causing the third person not to perform the contract, is 
10
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ing that the defendant either acted with a particular motive or used 
particular means.53  Additionally, if an alleged tortfeasor acts within 
the course and scope of employment to obtain the plaintiff’s dis­
charge from employment, the tortfeasor may act as the employer 
itself.  This bars a wrongful interference claim because a party can­
not tortiously interfere with its own contract.54  Nonetheless, the 
fact that claims that may arise against individual defendants in dis­
putes governed by employment law parallels the structure of Wilkes 
claims against individual shareholders—not the corporation—for 
breach of fiduciary duty. 
II. DEFAULT RULES, WHETHER OR NOT STICKY 
A. Efficient Solution, or Sticky Default? 
Traditional scholarly accounts of the at-will rule critiqued or 
defended it in theoretical terms.  Critics of the rule emphasized its 
unfairness to employees when increasingly specialized work bound 
them to their employers, which left employees vulnerable to over­
investing human capital in a particular job without much prospect 
of employment mobility.55  To its critics, the at-will rule stems from 
and reinforces a basic power imbalance between employers and 
employees56 and ignores the importance of workers’ stakes in their 
jobs as tantamount to conventional forms of property.57  Defenders 
subject to liability to the other for the pecuniary loss resulting to the other 
from the failure of the third person to perform the contract. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1977).  The Massachusetts standard requires 
that the defendant have acted with “actual malice” toward the plaintiff.  King v. Dris­
coll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 495 (Mass. 1994) (quoting Boothby v. Texon, Inc., 608 N.E.2d 
1028, 1040 (Mass. 1993)).  Personal gain and personal dislike generally do not meet this 
standard. Id. 
53. Under the Restatement (Second) of Torts, “[o]ne standing in a fiduciary rela­
tion with another is subject to liability to the other for harm resulting from a breach of 
duty imposed by the relation.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 874.  This formu­
lation does not require showing the fiduciary’s motive, just that the fiduciary’s conduct 
(which may consist of inaction) breached its duty to the beneficiary. 
54. See, e.g., McGanty v. Staudenraus, 901 P.2d 841, 847 (Or. 1995).  Courts vary 
in how they formulate the elements of a privilege to interfere with a fellow employee’s 
contract. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 7.01 note e (2006) (collecting and 
summarizing cases). 
55. See Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On 
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1404-05 
(1967). 
56. See PAUL  WEILER, GOVERNING THE  WORKPLACE: THE  FUTURE OF  LABOR 
AND EMPLOYMENT LAW 48-104 (1990). 
57. See Mary Ann Glendon & Edward R. Lev, Changes in the Bonding of the 
Employment Relationship: An Essay on the New Property, 20 B.C. L. REV. 457, 474 
(1979). 
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of the rule emphasized employee mobility via markets for labor, 
plus labor-market constraints on employers who might otherwise 
discharge employees arbitrarily or for foolish reasons.58  Addition­
ally, the discretion the rule confers on an employer enables it to 
react over the course of an employee’s tenure and to terminate a 
heretofore hard-working employee who begins to shirk from 
work.59  Moreover, by protecting an employer’s exercise of discre­
tion, the at-will rule spares the employer the prospect of after-the­
fact judicial review of its decision to discharge an employee as well 
as the before-the-fact costs of record-keeping and other documen­
tation that would follow a change away from the at-will rule.60 
More theoretically, and more in tension with the predicament 
of a shareholder-employee like Wilkes, at-will employment con­
tracts have been characterized as “fully bilateral, so that the em­
ployee can use the contract as a means to control the firm, just as 
the firm uses it to control the worker.”61  That is, just as an em­
ployer is free to threaten (and effect) termination, so is an em­
ployee.  However, full bilaterality would require that the employee, 
once discharged, be free of remaining ties to the employer, else the 
employee’s threat to quit would fall short of a mechanism for con­
trol over the employer.  Employees who also make illiquid equity 
investments in their employer may, like Wilkes, have an enduring 
tie to the employer that the employee cannot sever through unilat­
eral action.  This weakens or vitiates any employee empowerment 
that might otherwise stem from the bilateral character of an at-will 
relationship.62 
B. Terms in Employment Contracts 
Three recent scholarly developments bear directly on Wilkes: 
(1) studies that examine the extent to which employers and employ­
58. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC  ANALYSIS OF  LAW 329-330 (4th ed. 
1992). 
59. See Stewart J. Schwab, Life-Cycle Justice: Accommodating Just Cause and 
Employment at Will, 92 MICH. L. REV. 8, 8-12 (1993). 
60. See Jeffrey L. Harrison, The ‘New’ Terminable-at-Will Employment Contract: 
An Interest and Cost Incidence Analysis, 69 IOWA L. REV. 327, 331 (1984).  Nonetheless, 
to the extent employment at-will is subject to any exceptions, such as the “bad reasons” 
exceptions discussed supra note 9, an employer has an incentive to document its rea- R 
sons for terminating an at-will employee. 
61. See Epstein, supra note 42, at 957. R 
62. A buy-sell agreement can mitigate the risk that a former employee will re­
main a locked-in investor in equity that pays no dividends. See infra notes 141-143 and R 
accompanying text. 
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ees either adopt an at-will rule in explicit terms or agree to oust the 
at-will default for another rule; (2) studies that explore the accuracy 
with which employees understand the law, in particular the law of 
wrongful discharge; and (3) studies that acknowledge the prospect 
that the at-will default may not be optimal for all parties who do 
not agree otherwise and suggest explanations for its “stickiness” as 
a default.63  In general, empirical studies of employment contracts 
cast doubt on the assumption that at-will applies universally within 
an organization’s workforce, highlight the significance of context, 
and suggest that the at-will rule may be a sticky default more often 
and for a more complex set of reasons than heretofore believed. 
1. The Prevalence of Employment At-Will 
Theoretical defenses of at-will employment as a default rule 
emphasize not just its bilateral character but its universality within 
an organization’s non-unionized workforce; outside the precincts of 
tenured faculty within universities and governmental workers with 
civil-service protections, the same rule is assumed to apply to all 
within an organization.64  Although employment at-will is widely 
assumed to be the dominant rule in non-union employment set­
tings,65 only scant empirical data confirmed this assumption until 
the mid-1990s.66  Verkerke’s 1995 study, using data collected 
through surveys of employers, found that 52% of surveyed employ­
ers contracted explicitly for at-will employment relationships, while 
33% had “no documents that specify the terms governing dis­
charge.”67  About one employer in seven, or 15%, had documents 
requiring “just cause” for termination.68  Thus, although at-will by 
far dominated as the applicable rule, a not insignificant minority of 
employers (15%) could not discharge an employee without just 
cause.69 
Also of interest are the formal means through which employers 
contracted with employees: 61% of employers contracted through 
an employee handbook, while only 12% addressed in employment 
63. See text accompanying infra notes 99-120. R 
64. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 42, at 977.  Epstein’s article was noted in Stewart R 
J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of CEO Employment Con­
tracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 231, 232 (2006). 
65. See, e.g., Rock & Wachter, supra note 24, at 1930. R 
66. See Verkerke, supra note 32, at 865 (describing prior sources of empirical R 
data). 
67. Id. at 867. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
13
: INVESTING IN WORK: WILKES AS AN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2011
 \\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE209.txt unknown Seq: 14 11-AUG-11 15:54 
510 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:497 
applications the circumstances under which an employee might be 
discharged.70  Few (4%) employers used form contracts issued to 
individual employees, while only 5% stated discharge terms in of­
fers of employment.71 
Verkerke’s study found no significant variation across U.S. ju­
risdictions.72  However, contracting behavior varied systematically 
with employer size; small employers were twice as likely to use no 
documentation on point and were somewhat more likely to include 
“just cause” terms.73  Large employers were most likely to explicitly 
contract for at-will relationships.74 
These findings undergird Verkerke’s reaffirmation of at-will as 
the default rule.75  Numerically, for most employers surveyed, at-
will governed employment relationships either because the default 
rule was not ousted or, as for 55% of the employers surveyed, be­
cause the relevant contract explicitly adopted the rule.76  Thus, the 
at-will rule could be characterized as a “majoritarian” default, that 
is, a term replicating the outcome that most parties would choose 
through an explicit agreement.77  Shifting the default rule to require 
a showing of just cause to discharge an employee—based perhaps 
on the perception that employees misunderstand their legal 
rights78—would generate no additional information through em­
ployee-employer bargaining beyond that already evident through 
employee handbooks.79 
2. Whether Employees Understand Employment Law 
Offsetting somewhat the normative charge to be drawn from 
Verkerke’s data is a later study finding that employees misunder­
70. Id. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. at 868. 
73. Id.  The study used the size of a workforce to define employers’ size.  Small 
employers had fewer than fifty employees, midsize employers 50 to 249 employees, and 
large employers more than 250 employees. Id. at 868 n.132.  That small employers did 
not use documentation may stem from the fact that they “often have no formalized 
personnel function.” Id. In contrast, “midsize employers . . . more often have person­
nel managers, and large employers . . . almost always have specialized managers and . . . 
the cost of developing personnel policies can be spread over a larger number of employ­
ees.” Id. 
74. Id. at 868-69. 
75. Id. at 913. 
76. Id. at 867. 
77. Id. at 913. 
78. Id. at 886. 
79. Id. at 913. 
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stand the at-will default rule, overwhelmingly believing that the law 
requires a showing of just cause to justify discharge.80  Using survey 
data, Pauline Kim’s 1999 study found that “misunderstanding of the 
at-will rule is widespread.”81  For example, 82.2% of the respon­
dents to Kim’s survey thought an employer could not lawfully dis­
charge an employee solely to save costs.82  Respondents’ 
misperceptions of the lawfulness of discharge persisted once the 
survey instrument added a clear disclaimer that the employer “re­
serve[ed] the right to discharge at any time, for any reason, with or 
without cause.”83  To Kim, the strongest explanation for this pattern 
of erroneous understanding is the prevalence of extra-legal norms 
that forbid discharging an employee without cause.84  Additionally, 
employee misperception persists over time and in the face of ob­
served or experienced terminations, which suggests that mispercep­
tion may be reinforced by employees’ attachment to jobs they 
already have and from which they can benefit from invested effort 
over time only if the employment relationship is relatively secure.85 
80. See Pauline T. Kim, Norms, Learning, and Law: Exploring the Influences on 
Workers’ Legal Knowledge, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 447, 459 (1999). 
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 457. 
83. Id.  Once presented with the disclaimer, 74% of Kim’s respondents continued 
to believe that a discharge motivated purely by cost-savings would be illegal. Id. 
84. Id. at 494-95; see also Rock & Wachter, supra note 24, at 1914-18 (exploring R 
extra-legal norms that constrain discharge within organizations).  Pauline Kim’s study 
calls into question the salience to the employment context of Ellickson’s canonical 
study of the operation extra-legal norms within rural communities. See ROBERT C. 
ELLICKSON, ORDER  WITHOUT  LAW: HOW  NEIGHBORS  SETTLE  DISPUTES (1991).  The 
communities Ellickson studied were close-knit ones that afforded ample opportunities 
to enforce sanctions for conduct that contravened a community norm through repeat 
interactions among community members. Id. at 56-59.  In contrast, Kim characterizes 
employment as more like a relationship between a power plant and a coal mine, typi­
fied by explicit specification in legally-effective form of the parties mutual and obliga­
tions.  Kim, supra note 80, at 502.  This is because R 
[i]f one focuses on the decision to join the firm, rather than the myriad of
 
minute, ongoing adjustments in terms, the employment relationship appears
 
more like a one-shot transaction than a repeat-play situation.  Moreover, for
 
the career employee, whose sunk investments render her increasingly vulnera­
ble to employer opportunism over time, the stakes may be very high indeed.
 
Id.  Additionally, and in contrast to the communities studied by Ellickson whose mem­
bers are embedded in relationships implying ongoing interactions, “the . . . norm forbid­
ding discharge without cause by definition comes into play at the end of the 
relationship,” and a violation of the norm ends the relationship. Id. at 503 (emphasis 
omitted). 
85. Kim, supra note 80, at 496.  Employees may also misunderstand and underes- R 
timate the rights the law confers on them. See Mitu Gulati et al., The New Old Legal 
Realism 27 (Duke Law Scholarship Repository, Working Paper, 2010), available at 
http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2951&context=faculty_ 
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Whatever the explanation, if “workers overwhelmingly misunder­
stand the law’s protections,”86 viewing at-will employment as a re­
flection of informed choice on the part of employees does not allay 
doubts about at-will as the default rule.  At a minimum, it generates 
unhappy surprises and perceptions of unfair treatment for at-will 
employees discharged without cause. 
3. The Terms of CEOs’ Contracts 
As it happens, the frequency with which employers and em­
ployees agree to employment on terms other than at-will is mark­
edly higher for contracts between large corporations and their 
CEOs.  In a study of CEO employment contracts from 1984 
through 2003 (with the bulk of the sample from the late 1990s), 
Schwab and Thomas found that “CEOs overwhelmingly contract 
around the at-will default standard of termination.”87  Of the 375 
CEO contracts in their sample, only twenty-five stated the contract 
to be at-will, while most gave the CEO greater (financial) rights 
against the company in the event of a termination without cause.88 
But twenty-four of the expressly at-will contracts also gave the 
CEO greater rights in the event of termination without cause.89 
Most contracts—86.93%—ran “for a definite term of years.”90 
Definitions of “just cause” in CEO employment contracts most 
often listed “willful misconduct, moral turpitude, failure to perform 
duties, breach of fiduciary duties, and gross misconduct,” and much 
less often sexual harassment (0.53%), incompetence (3.47%), or 
substance abuse (4.80%).91  On the other hand, CEOs in Schwab 
and Thomas’s sample typically had the right to quit without finan­
cial consequences only for “good reason” (a defined term), not sim­
ply to pursue greener pastures elsewhere.92 
The data assembled by Schwab and Thomas suggest that, at the 
least, CEOs “are quite different from other employees.”93  Presum­
ably, they argue, CEOs’ contracts protect them against the rigors of 
at-will employment “because the value to the CEO of just-cause 
scholarship (stating that a sample of casino workers interviewed believed Nevada law 
limited their ability to sue under federal anti-discrimination law). 
86. Kim, supra note 80, at 506. R 
87. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 64, at 233. R 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 234. 
93. Id. at 241. 
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protection exceeds the cost to the firm” because a firing harms the 
CEO’s reputation and other firms, post-firing, will be reluctant to 
hire him or her.94  The extra compensation triggered by a non-fault 
termination should be calibrated to discourage a CEO from con­
duct that would justify discharge for cause.95 
Additionally, Schwab and Thomas’s data are consistent with 
the exercise of bargaining power by candidates for CEO positions 
(and by incumbent CEOs negotiating the terms of a new contract) 
and with differences in the texture or structure of processes through 
which a contract is formed.  The formal qualities of a corporation’s 
contract with its CEO differ from the generalized policy statements 
in employee manuals that typify the employee handbooks through 
which the employers in Verkerke’s study documented their rela­
tionships with the run of the mill employees.96  CEO contracts are 
the product of individualized deals in which both CEO and com­
pany are separately represented by counsel; counsel for the com­
pany usually generates the first draft of the contract, a practice 
explained by the fact “that these contracts become public informa­
tion, which gives the company a strong interest in ensuring that it 
does not establish unfavorable future precedents in its negotiations 
with other employees or future CEOs.”97  Moreover, represented 
by counsel, prospective and incumbent CEOs are, unlike the re­
spondents in Kim’s survey, highly unlikely to be misinformed about 
the default rule applicable to at-will relationships of employment. 
Thus, in this context, at-will employment may not be a sticky 
default. 
C. Explanations for Stickiness 
Even if CEOs are sui generis among employees, the starkness 
of Schwab and Thomas’s data should prompt many questions.98  For 
example, are CEOs alone in wishing to preserve their reputations 
94. Id. at 248. 
95. Id. 
96. Verkerke, supra note 32, at 867.  No study appears to investigate the contrac- R 
tual terms applicable to executive officers other than CEOs. 
97. Schwab & Thomas, supra note 64, at 237.  Only when a prospective CEO “has R 
extraordinary negotiating power” would his or her counsel prepare the initial draft. Id. 
98. To characterize CEO contracts as stemming from flawed corporate govern­
ance processes does not itself answer these questions. For one thing, CEO contracts 
adopt an alternative to the at-will default with a near-uniformity missing in other as­
pects of large public companies’ contracts with their CEOs, such as compensation struc­
tures and pay levels.  On governance flaws and CEO compensation, see LUCIAN 
BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE 23-53 (2004). 
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from the damage any termination may cause?  Might it be that less-
well-paid employees would be even more concerned about the af­
termath of discharge?  Are the terms of CEOs’ contracts closer to 
those a well-informed employee would wish and would pursue 
through negotiations than the at-will rule documented by most of 
the employers in Verkerke’s study?  And, as explored below, if de­
fault rules sometimes prevail because parties are deterred from ne­
gotiating around the rule—in particular, by the prospect that they 
will thereby signal bad information about themselves to the other 
parties—why are CEOs so uniformly undeterred? 
Scholarship examining default rules in a range of contracting 
contexts identifies several possible explanations for parties’ failure 
to oust a default rule and adopt a term that they prefer. Three gen­
eral categories of explanation seem plausible in at-will employment 
relationships, including that in Wilkes.  These are: (1) the direct 
costs of drafting an alternative term; (2) cognitive biases of all sorts, 
including misinformation about the substance of the default rule; 
and (3) the deterrent impact of anticipating the other parties’ reac­
tions if an alternate to the default rule were to be suggested. Wilkes 
itself suggests a fourth explanation, specific to founder-shareholders 
who are also employees, which is the inevitable risk of fluidity or 
indeterminacy in control over their employer. 
1. Direct Costs of Drafting to Replace Default Rule 
Earlier accounts of stickiness in default rules emphasized the 
direct cost of drafting an alternative better tailored to the parties’ 
specific circumstances.99  Employment may be a context in which 
drafting costs and their allocation remain significant.  Many em­
ployees are not frequent repeat players in negotiating the terms of 
their employment, while employers are; and many employees lack 
the financial resources to retain counsel to assist them in employ­
ment negotiations.  Thus, the use of counsel by present and incum­
bent CEOs is telling. 
Additionally, the facts in Wilkes itself suggest that the parties 
made only limited investment of financial resources into legal ser­
vices and customized drafting.100  According to the court’s opinion, 
after Wilkes acquired an option to purchase the property to be op­
99. See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An 
Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 73 CALIF. L. 
REV. 261, 263 (1985). 
100. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-61 (Mass. 
1976). 
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erated as a nursing home and enlisted three acquaintances as co­
venturers, “[he] consulted his attorney, who advised him that if the 
four men were to operate the contemplated nursing home as 
planned, they would be partners and would be liable for any debts 
incurred by the partnership and by each other.”101  As a conse­
quence of the attorney’s advice and following consultation among 
the prospective shareholders, “ownership of the property was 
vested in Springside, a corporation organized under Massachusetts 
law.”102  Lawyers, legal advice, and legal drafting play no role in the 
remainder of the court’s factual narrative up until the point of the 
annual meeting in which Wilkes was not re-elected as a director.103 
2. Cognitive Biases and Errors 
More recent accounts of stickiness identify a variety of cogni­
tive biases that may impede contracting around a default term.104 
Parties may exhibit an “endowment effect” through an unwar­
ranted attachment to existing legal rules that would lead them to 
prefer a default rule regardless of its content.105  The rule’s familiar­
ity may induce inertia that the parties do not overcome.106 
Ben-Shahar and Pottow tested the thesis of inertial attachment 
to default rules in the employment context with a cross-country 
comparison using the United States and Canada.107  In general, the 
default rule in Ontario (the most populous Canadian province) is 
close to the opposite of the at-will default in the United States.108 
Although employers in Ontario technically have the power to dis­
miss employees, they must make “termination” or “notice” pay­
ments to an employee discharged without just cause.109  But 
contracts between employee and employer may change these terms, 
subject to a mandatory minimum of employee-protective rights.110 
Ben-Shahar and Pottow asked Canadian labor lawyers how often 
101. Id. at 659. 
102. Id. 
103. Wilkes, unable to attend the meeting, was represented by his attorney as his 
proxy. Id. at 661. 
104. For a helpful summary, see Omri Ben-Shahar & John A. E. Pottow, On the 
Stickiness of Default Rules, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 651, 655-56 (2006). 
105. Id. at 655. 
106. For the “inertia effect,” see Russell Korobkin, Inertia and Preference in Con­
tract Negotiation: The Psychological Power of Default Rules and Form Terms, 51 VAND. 
L. REV. 1583, 1585-86 (1998). 
107. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 678-80. R 
108. See id. at 679. 
109. Id. at 678. 
110. Id. at 679. 
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employers opted out of the employee-friendly “just cause” default 
and learned that “the same trend of prevalent ‘non-contracting’ 
that exists under the American experience” also prevails in Ca­
nada.111  Indeed, and consistent with some of Verkerke’s findings, 
one of Ben-Shahar and Pottow’s lawyer-respondents reported that 
“[i]n fact, most ‘contracts’ for employment consist entirely of a one-
page offer letter saying, ‘Congratulations, please report to your first 
day of work on this day at this pay.’”112 
To Ben-Shahar and Pottow, drafting costs are not an adequate 
explanation for inertial attachment to the just-cause default given 
the simplicity with which a one-page letter could be converted into 
“a one-and-a-quarter page letter, with a further sentence setting by 
contract the termination benefits.”113  Moreover—and unless radi­
cally different explanations for attachment to a default apply in Ca­
nada—the fact that Canadian employment contracts depart from 
the applicable default norm no more than do counterpart contracts 
in the United States does not reaffirm the merits of either 
default.114 
The “persistent stickiness”115 of the just-cause default in Cana­
dian employment contracts also calls into question the weight one 
might assign to Kim’s findings of widespread and persistent misun­
derstanding on the part of employees about employment law in the 
United States.116  One might be tempted to argue that such perva­
sive misunderstanding might explain why employees do not more 
aggressively seek contract terms other than the at-will default. 
However, the parallel persistent stickiness of the just-cause default 
in Canadian employment contracts is unlikely to be explained by a 
comparable level of misunderstanding on the part of Canadian em­
ployers and their lawyers.  Moreover, if power imbalances between 
employees and employers explain the stickiness of at-will in em­
ployment relationships governed by U.S. law, one would expect 
that a comparable imbalance north of the border would lead to 
more Canadian contracts ousting the just-cause default. Finally, 
perhaps the Canadian default rule has proven sticky because it co­
incides with an extra-legal norm that requires just cause to termi­
111. Id. 
112. Id. See generally Verkerke, supra note 32. R 
113. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 680. R 
114. But see Verkerke, supra note 32, at 913 (arguing prevalence of at-will choice R 
in sample of U.S. employment contracts reaffirms position of at-will as default rule). 
115. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 680-81. R 
116. See supra notes 80-85 and accompanying text. R 
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nate employment, perhaps even more sticky than the at-will default 
in the United States which may be at odds with extra-legal norms. If 
so, the Canadian just-cause default may represent the outcome 
many parties would reach through bargaining, as opposed to an in­
ertial outcome that requires an explanation such as cognitive bias, 
drafting costs, or inhibitions that stem from anticipating other par­
ties’ reactions to seeking an alternative rule. 
3. Deterrent Impact of Anticipated Signaling Effects 
A default rule may also become sticky because a party who 
proposes an alternative to the default in contractual negotiations 
may signal adverse information about herself, whether or not accu­
rately.  Fear of this signaling effect may deter willingness to bargain 
to alter the default.  Kamiat characterized the inhibitory impact of 
signaling as an instance of a “lemons” problem of bilateral asymme­
tries in information.117  That is, both a prospective employee and an 
employer have unique access to information about themselves that 
is not readily discoverable by the other.  Neither can reliably know, 
on the basis of the other’s demand for a contract term, whether the 
demand is a reliable signal of (for example) a prospective em­
ployee’s propensity to shirk or a prospective employer’s propensity 
to discharge its employees arbitrarily or opportunistically.118 
Theoretical accounts differ on the significance of signaling ef­
fects in the employment-contracting context. Verkerke argues that 
signaling effects are symmetrical and cancel each other out: “[j]ust 
as prospective employees send an adverse signal by demanding just 
cause, so an employer might signal, by demanding an at will rela­
tionship or refusing to agree to a just cause term, that it is unusually 
likely to discharge workers without cause.”119  Thus, no unequivo­
cal implications about an optimal default rule could be drawn from 
the signaling phenomenon.  In contrast, Ben-Shahar and Pottow ar­
gue that signals may not cancel each other out in the employment 
context because 
it is equally plausible that the employee’s and the employer’s 
concerns about negative inferences will compound one another 
in a vicious cycle, with the employee worrying about the em­
117. Kamiat, supra note 24, at 1958.  The “lemons” problem is developed as a R 
characterization of contracting problems in the market for used cars in George A. 
Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 
Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
118. Kamiat, supra note 24, at 1958. R 
119. Verkerke, supra note 32, at 903. R 
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ployer’s propensity to discharge summarily by insisting on at will 
and the employer worrying about the employee’s work ethic by 
insisting on just cause.120 
Put differently, the signals sent by the prospective employee’s 
and the employer’s demands may reduce either’s willingness to put 
the issue on the table at all. 
Neither account explains why CEOs seem uniformly uninhib­
ited by signaling phenomena.  Employment contracts with CEOs 
may so transcend—and not just in amounts of compensation!— 
more mundane employment contracting to warrant sui generis 
treatment.  Alternatively, perhaps the bargaining leverage of a pro­
spective or successful incumbent CEO dominates negative signals 
otherwise associated with insistence on a just-cause standard.  Ad­
ditionally, to the extent that Schwab and Thomas’s data establish 
near-uniformity with which CEO contracts opt out of the at-will 
default, in that context widespread practice may have created an 
alternative just-cause default to be included in a CEO’s contract as 
a matter of course.  An employer’s decision to omit such a de facto 
default from its draft contract could send a strongly negative signal 
to a prospective or incumbent CEO, which would be amplified by 
the CEO’s counsel when counsel furnishes expert interpretation of 
the signal being sent on the basis of counsel’s familiarity with con­
ventional practice. 
4. Indeterminacy of Employer 
At-will employment may also become a sticky default when, as 
in Wilkes, the ordinary employer-employee dichotomy is both com­
plex and potentially murky.  As Springside’s founders, all four ini­
tial shareholders contemporaneously became both its employees 
and members of its governance structure as officers and directors of 
the corporation.  As the facts of the case illustrate, this structure did 
not assure stability for any one shareholder because a 25% share-
holding does not confer control over the board, nor does one seat 
on a four-member board.  Thus, although Wilkes was initially a co­
equal member of Springside’s board, and thus a co-equal partici­
pant in his employer’s governance, once his fellow shareholders de­
clined to reelect him to the board, he became a non-director 
employee-shareholder, whose termination as an employee at the 
120. Ben-Shahar & Pottow, supra note 104, at 678. R 
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behest of the remaining shareholder-directors followed.121  Al­
though formally and as an entity Springside remained Wilkes’s em­
ployer throughout, in a more pragmatic sense, its orientation and 
allegiance shifted to exclude Wilkes.122 
At the outset, all four shareholders—were they to consider the 
question—would realize that their participation as investor-employ­
ees in Springside subjected each of them to a risk of exclusion from 
employment and board membership.  The risk materialized many 
years later only for Wilkes.  Nothing in the court’s opinion suggests 
that the four shareholders considered varying through contract ei­
ther the at-will default or the corporate-law default of locked-in in­
vestment, discussed below. Thus, Wilkes exemplifies the stickiness 
of specific default terms with no factual basis to explain the parties’ 
failure to contract otherwise. 
Beyond general explanations for the stickiness of the at-will 
default discussed above, another possibility is evident on the facts 
of Wilkes.  When the four shareholders formed Springside in 1951, 
it may not have been evident to them that the control over their 
employer could prove indeterminate or fluid over time.  Not until 
1965 did disagreement set in between Wilkes and Quinn, followed 
in 1967 by Wilkes’s exclusion.123  Thus, the risk of exclusion may 
well have seemed remote in 1951, sixteen years before it material­
ized for Wilkes.  Much research investigates the phenomenon of 
over-discounting the significance of remote risks.124  Moreover, 
raising in 1951 the prospect of a subsequent falling-out may well 
have been a negative signal of potential contentiousness that none 
of the four shareholders wished to send. That is, the other share­
holders might have interpreted the initiative as a signal, not neces­
sarily of a propensity to shirk from work as an employee, but as a 
signal of an edgy or unduly legalistic temperament. To send such a 
signal conflicts with manifesting commitment to a functionally har­
monious relationship. 
121. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 659-61 (Mass. 
1976). 
122. Id. Thus, the court found it unnecessary to determine whether Wilkes’s 
“claim is governed by partnership law or by the law applicable to business corpora­
tions.” Id. at 661. 
123. Id. at 660-61. 
124. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 9, at 413; Bailey Kulkin, The Asymmetrical R 
Conditions of Legal Responsibility in the Market Place, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 893, 977 
(1990). 
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III. SHAREHOLDER-EMPLOYEE DISPUTES RE-EXAMINED 
Much in the subsequent evolution in Massachusetts cases ap­
plying Wilkes can best be explained by viewing Wilkes as ousting 
the default rule of at-will employment in a specific context to re­
place it with a different default rule containing an irreducible core 
of mandatory law.125  Other jurisdictions that adopted Wilkes like­
wise confine its operation to the same context, which is the termina­
tion of a founding or substantial shareholder’s at-will employment, 
coupled with a lock-in of the shareholder’s illiquid equity invest­
ment.  In this context, and to these courts, employment at-will is a 
sticky default unlikely to represent an optimal choice for the par­
ties.  Jurisdictions that reject Wilkes may perceive the parties’ fail­
ure to oust the at-will default as consistent with their choice of a 
rule that is optimal for them, or, more realistically, as a choice that 
does not warrant judicial intervention to oust the at-will default be­
cause the choice may well be optimal for some who make it. To the 
extent a court perceives Wilkes as a generalized threat to at-will as 
the employment-law default rule as opposed to a doctrine localized 
to an exceptional type of employment relationship, the court may 
well reject the Wilkes doctrine. 
A. The scope of Wilkes 
Subsequent cases sketching in the contours of Wilkes as ap­
plied to different facts identify founders like Wilkes as the most 
obvious category of shareholder-employees whose discharge trig­
gers application of the Wilkes standard.126  In contrast, an employee 
at-will “who happens to own stock” falls outside the scope of 
Wilkes.127  In Merola v. Exergen Corp., the Supreme Judicial Court 
held that “although the plaintiff invested in [the corporation’s 
stock] with the reasonable expectation of continued employment,” 
his employment was not formally linked to stock ownership, nor 
was he a founding shareholder.128  Additionally, unlike Springside, 
the corporation did not distribute all its profits to shareholders 
through salary payments.129  Thus, by causing the corporation to 
125. The Wilkes doctrine is also applicable to controlling members of LLCs, a 
point with implications beyond the scope of this article. See Pointer v. Castellani, 918 
N.E.2d 805, 815 (Mass. 2009) (affirming judgment in favor of LLC’s former president-
member; court observed that “[i]t is uncontested that [LLC] is a close corporation”). 
126. See infra text accompanying notes 128-136. R 
127. Merola v. Exergen Corp., 668 N.E.2d 351, 355 (Mass. 1996). 
128. Id. at 354. 
129. Id. 
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terminate the plaintiff’s at-will employment without a legitimate 
business purpose, the controlling shareholder did not breach any 
fiduciary duty to the plaintiff under Wilkes.130  Along the same 
lines, in McLaughlin v. Schenck, the Utah Supreme Court held that, 
although shareholders in close corporations owe each other fiduci­
ary duties, the duty is not breached by the termination of an at-will 
employee who is not a founding shareholder “who created the com­
pany with the expectation of employment,” which explicitly ties em­
ployment to investment expectations.131 
Like the plaintiff in Merola, the plaintiff in McLaughlin joined 
the corporation primarily in the guise of an employee, one permit­
ted but not required to buy stock.132  Thus, the McLaughlin court 
did not evaluate the plaintiff’s discharge under the Wilkes standard 
because the discharge did not thwart the plaintiff’s investment 
expectations.133 
Additionally, the discharge of an at-will shareholder-employee 
who falls within the category covered by Wilkes does not always 
constitute a breach of fiduciary duty. The other shareholders may 
have no alternative less harmful to the discharged shareholder-em­
ployee.  For example, in Pulsifer v. BitFlow, Inc., the court held that 
terminating the employment of “a shareholder who neglects his du­
ties or who disrupts company business” does not constitute a breach 
of fiduciary duty because “[t]here is no legal requirement to keep a 
disruptive or idle employee on the payroll.”134  On the other hand, 
when less harmful means could accomplish the overriding business 
objective, controlling shareholders breach their fiduciary duty when 
they neglect at least to explore them. Thus, in Leslie v. Boston 
130. Id. at 355. 
131. McLaughlin v. Schenck, 220 P.3d 146, 158 (Utah 2009). Accord Hollis v. 
Hill, 232 F.3d 460, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2000) (applying Nevada law). Hollis articulates a list 
of non-exclusive factors to aid in identifying the relevant category of shareholders: 
[W]hether the corporation typically distributes its profits in the form of sala­
ries; whether the shareholder/employee owns a significant percentage of the 
firm’s shares; whether the shareholder/employee is a founder of the business; 
whether the shares were received as compensation for services; whether the 
shareholder/employee expects the value of the shares to increase; whether the 
shareholder/employee has made a significant capital contribution; whether the 
shareholder/employee has demonstrated a reasonable expectation that the re­
turns from investment will be obtained through continued employment; and 
whether stock ownership is a requirement of employment. 
Id. at 471. 
132. McLaughlin, 220 P.3d at 158. 
133. Id. at 157-58. 
134. Pulsifer v. BitFlow, Inc., No. 974508, 2001 WL 170453, at *19 (Mass. Super. 
Jan. 26, 2001). 
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Software Collaborative, Inc., the court agreed with the defendants’ 
opinion that the plaintiff was not a model employee.135  Nonethe­
less, as a founding (and one-third) equity investor, the plaintiff had 
a right to be treated with the utmost good faith by the defendants, 
who appear not to have considered alternatives to discharging the 
plaintiff, such as assigning him to other duties or encouraging him 
to upgrade his skills.136 
B. Wilkes as a Default Rule 
When applicable, Wilkes ousts the default rule of at-will em­
ployment.  In its stead Wilkes imposes a just-cause standard for dis­
charge keyed to a legitimate business purpose, against which a 
plaintiff may still succeed by showing the existence of means less 
harmful through which the purpose could be accomplished.137  Sub­
sequent cases make clear that the Wilkes standard is itself a default 
rule that may be replaced by terms to which shareholders explicitly 
agree.138  In Massachusetts, although such an agreement does not 
relieve shareholders of their fiduciary duties to each other,139 the 
agreement’s explicit terms may narrow the scope of conduct to 
which fiduciary duties apply.  Explicitly addressing the circum­
stances under which employment may be terminated replaces the 
Wilkes default.  The plaintiff in Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C. 
had a written employment agreement providing for an initial one-
year term of employment, “‘continuing thereafter from year to year 
until either party shall have given written notice to the other that he 
(it) wishes to terminate the contract,’” the notice to be effective in 
six months.140  The court acknowledged that such a provision did 
not “relieve stockholders of the high fiduciary duty owed to one 
another in all their mutual dealings” but held that discharge in com­
pliance with the provision, entered into by the plaintiff at the outset 
135. Leslie v. Bos. Software Collaborative, Inc., No. 010268BLS, 2002 WL 
532605, at *8 (Mass. Super. Feb. 12, 2002). In particular, tensions arose between the 
plaintiff and the other two founding shareholders because he felt undercompensated. 
Id. at *2.  Customers and employees complained about the plaintiff’s “brusque” manner 
and ethnic slurs. Id. at *3.  Three employees threatened to quit but were dissuaded 
when promised higher pay. Id. Inter-shareholder tensions escalated further, culminat­
ing in the plaintiff’s threat, communicated via email, that the plaintiff’s wife might shoot 
one or both of the other founding shareholders. Id. at *4. 
136. Id. at *8. 
137. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976). 
138. See infra text accompanying notes 140-143. R 
139. See King v. Driscoll, 638 N.E.2d 488, 494 (Mass. 1994). 
140. Blank v. Chelmsford Ob/Gyn, P.C., 649 N.E.2d 1102, 1104 (Mass. 1995). 
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of employment, gave the plaintiff all for which he had bargained.141 
Thus, Wilkes replaces one default rule with another, which the par­
ties ousted by agreement in Blank. 
Additionally, the corporation’s founding shareholders in Blank 
executed a stock purchase agreement providing that the corpora­
tion would repurchase their shares at book value upon stated cir­
cumstances, including termination of employment.142  The court 
held that the purchase agreement eliminated any question about 
how the value of the plaintiff’s shares might be determined upon 
the termination of his employment; although “[a] duty of good faith 
and fair dealing exists during the course of events leading up to and 
including termination, [the performance of] that duty is to be evalu­
ated in light of” an employment agreement that confers on both 
parties a right to terminate without cause.143  Thus, a stock 
purchase agreement in itself does not oust the Wilkes default but, 
when combined with an explicit employment agreement, narrows— 
perhaps as a practical matter eliminates—the range of conduct to 
which it applies.  In contrast, in King v. Driscoll, in which the plain­
tiff had no explicit employment agreement, the fact that the share­
holders had agreed to stock buy-back terms did not immunize the 
defendant-shareholders from scrutiny under a fiduciary lens of their 
conduct that culminated in the plaintiff’s discharge.144 
141. Id. at 1106. 
142. Id. at 1104-05. 
143. Id. at 1106. Blank is an important clarification of the court’s holding in 
Evangelista v. Holland, that “[q]uestions of good faith and loyalty do not arise when all 
the stockholders in advance enter into an agreement for the purchase of stock of a 
withdrawing or deceased stockholder.”  Evangelista v. Holland, 537 N.E.2d 589, 592 
(Mass. App. Ct. 1989).  In Evangelista, the agreement was triggered by a stockholder’s 
death, not termination of employment. Id. at 591. Evangelista relied on a footnote in 
Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., which stated that “[o]f course, a close corporation 
may purchase shares from one stockholder without offering the others an equal oppor­
tunity if all the other stockholders give advance consent . . . through acceptance of an 
appropriate provision.” Id. at 593 (citing Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 328 
N.E.2d 505, 598 n.24 (Mass. 1975)); see also Stephenson v. Drever, 947 P.2d 1301, 1305 
(Cal. 1997) (holding that unless contract provides otherwise, terminated employee con­
tinues to have minority shareholder rights until compliance with valuation provisions in 
buy-back agreement). Stephenson interpreted an earlier buy-back precedent, Coleman 
v. Taub, 638 F.2d 628, 634-35 (3d Cir. 1981), to “stand[ ] for . . . the proposition that an 
employee-shareholder may bargain away his right to remain a shareholder after termi­
nation of his employment, and with it the benefits of the fiduciary duty owed by major­
ity to minority shareholders.” Stephenson, 947 P.2d at 1309. 
144. King, 638 N.E.2d at 494.  The court also held that the corporation did not act 
wrongfully in discharging the plaintiff because he participated in a shareholder deriva­
tive suit challenging the terms of the buy-back plan. Id. at 492-93.  The dispute con­
cerned matters internal to the corporation and did not implicate broader interests that 
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C. Outside Wilkes’s Field of Influence 
Jurisdictions that reject Wilkes—most notably Delaware and 
New York—reject its linkage between a shareholder’s interests as 
an investor and as an employee.  In Riblet Products Corp. v. Nagy, 
the federal-court jury found that the corporation breached the 
terms of its employment contract with the plaintiff, allegedly at the 
behest of its controlling shareholders, whom it found also breached 
their fiduciary duties to the plaintiff.145  The Seventh Circuit af­
firmed the jury’s verdict on the breach of contract claim146 but certi­
fied to the Delaware Supreme Court the question of whether 
Delaware law recognized the plaintiff’s fiduciary-duty claim.147 
Answering the question no, the Delaware court emphasized the 
separateness of rights arising from the plaintiff’s employment con­
tract and his rights as a shareholder.148  The court conceded that the 
corporation’s controlling shareholders “may well owe fiduciary du­
ties to [the plaintiff] as a minority shareholder . . . [b]ut that is not 
the issue here” because the plaintiff alleged no harm to himself as a 
shareholder, such as a wrongful freeze-out or injury to him as a 
shareholder stemming from termination of his employment.149  Ad­
ditionally, it is clear that under Delaware law the fact that a corpo­
ration is closely held does not itself warrant applying a distinct 
fiduciary standard to protect non-controlling shareholders.150 
underlie public-policy exceptions to employment at-will. Id. at 493.  The court explicitly 
differentiated between the plaintiff’s wrongful-termination claim and his fiduciary duty 
claim and affirmed the trial court’s judgment for the plaintiff on the fiduciary duty 
claim. See id. at 494. 
145. Riblet Prod. Corp. v. Nagy, 683 A.2d 37, 38 (Del. 1996). The plaintiff alleged 
that the controlling shareholders’ motive for firing him was “‘to reduce their risk under 
[certain] guarantees.’” Id. at 40 n.4.  Presumably, these guarantees are the ones given 
to lenders to fund the defendants’ prior leveraged buy-out through which they acquired 
an 85% equity interest in the corporation. Id. at 38.  The plaintiff, employed as the 
corporation’s CEO, was entitled to significant post-termination benefits under his em­
ployment agreement unless he was discharged for cause. These were “‘all salaries, ben­
efits, bonuses, and other direct and indirect forms of compensation’ for the remainder 
of [the] five-year term” of his employment contract. Id. 
146. Nagy v. Riblet Prod. Corp., 79 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 1996). The defendants 
argued that the plaintiff had been discharged for cause, which would eliminate his right 
to significant post-termination benefits. Id. at 574. 
147. Id. at 577-78. 
148. Riblet Prod. Corp., 683 A.2d at 40. 
149. Id. 
150. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1380-81 (Del. 1993) (stating that it is 
“inappropriate . . . for [the] [c]ourt to fashion a special judicially-created rule for minor­
ity investors when” corporation has not elected formal treatment as a close corporation 
under corporation statute or “there are no negotiated special provisions in the certifi­
cate of incorporation, by-laws, or stockholder agreements”). 
28
Western New England Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 2 [2011], Art. 10
http://digitalcommons.law.wne.edu/lawreview/vol33/iss2/10
 \\jciprod01\productn\W\WNE\33-2\WNE209.txt unknown Seq: 29 11-AUG-11 15:54 
2011] WILKES AS AN EMPLOYMENT LAW CASE 525 
Shareholders’ capacity to agree to special terms authorized by the 
corporation statute—terms varying default norms in corporate 
law—delegitimates intervention by the court to vary the default 
terms.151 
In contrast, the plaintiff in Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 
the leading New York case, was an employee at will with no explicit 
employment agreement whose stock was subject to a shareholders’ 
agreement that gave the controlling shareholder the right to 
purchase it “‘if [plaintiff] shall cease to be an employee of the Cor­
poration for any reason.’”152  The Ingle court held that the plaintiff 
had no basis on which to challenge his discharge, although the 
plaintiff alleged that it was motivated by the controlling share­
holder’s desire to acquire his shares.153  The plaintiff, however, did 
not challenge the fairness of the price he received.154 
Indeed, under New York law employees at-will who challenge 
the fairness of a mandatory stock repurchase fare no better than the 
Ingle plaintiff.  In Gallagher v. Lambert, the plaintiff alleged he was 
fired by his employer so that its controlling shareholders would 
benefit through the corporation’s repurchase of his 8.5% sharehold­
ing, having timed the plaintiff’s termination so that it fell within the 
last month of the period in which the buyback price would be set at 
book value.155  The court held that the plaintiff was bound by the 
explicit terms of the buy-back obligation, “[t]here being no dispute 
that the employer had the unfettered discretion to fire plaintiff at 
any time.”156 
To the Gallagher dissent, the majority conflated employment-
law and corporate-law concerns: “[t]he court’s insistence that the 
rationale of Ingle . . . must be carried over—lock, stock and bar­
rel—even to the fiduciary obligations owed minority shareholders 
151. Id. (observing that so to intervene would constitute “inappropriate judicial 
legislation” and would violate doctrine of independent legal significance). 
152. Ingle v. Glamore Motor Sales, Inc., 535 N.E.2d 1311, 1312 (N.Y. 1989). 
153. Id. at 1314. 
154. Id. 
155. Gallagher v. Lambert, 549 N.E.2d 136, 136-37 (N.Y. 1989).  After that 
month, the benchmark for the buy-back price was the company’s earnings. Id. 
156. Id. at 138.  The majority opinion points out that the plaintiff “helped write” 
the buy-back formula. Id. at 137.  As the dissent notes, the majority opinion does not 
examine whether the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing constrains the 
controlling shareholder’s exercise of discretion to cause the corporation to terminate 
the plaintiff’s employment for reasons unrelated to the corporation’s business needs. 
Id. at 141.  New York cases do not recognize the covenant’s applicability to arguably 
opportunistic decisions to terminate employment. See supra note 34 and accompanying R 
text. 
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in close corporations, plainly represents an extension of the law to a 
different jural relationship.”157  In contrast with Wilkes, the NewY­
ork court in Gallagher held that the force of New York’s at-will 
default may trump even an employee’s interests as an investor.158 
To be sure, Gallagher does not convert employment at-will from a 
default rule to a mandatory one, but metaphorically it enhances at­
will’s gravitational pull or field of force over other issues and le­
gally-protected interests. 
D. Sticky Defaults Revisited 
The possibility that a default rule may be sticky affords a more 
theoretical perspective on these differences among jurisdictions, as 
well as how the Wilkes doctrine itself evolved.  A starting point is 
the possibility that courts differ in their assessment of the limits of 
human cognition and capacity to address risk through explicit 
agreements, as well as the appropriateness of judicial interventions 
that reflect awareness of such limitations. Thus, the Delaware posi­
tion, which emphasizes the availability of express contractual work­
arounds to default rules in corporate law and to the at-will de-
fault,159 assumes a robust potential for anticipating or mitigating 
risk through explicit terms.  If there is a gap between, on the one 
hand, the theoretical availability of alternatives to default rules that 
the parties to a transaction might prefer, and, on the other hand, 
the realistic prospect that those alternatives will be identified and 
implemented in enforceable explicit contract terms, Delaware 
courts limit their curative role, at least on the issues relevant to this 
Article.160  The Wilkes doctrine, in contrast, is a plausible response 
157. Gallagher, 549 N.E.2d at 139. 
158. Id. at 141. 
159. See Rizzitiello v. McDonald’s Corp., 868 A.2d 825, 830 (Del. 2005) (rejecting 
argument that plaintiff had been constructively discharged in violation of contractual 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing and stating that “[i]n Delaware, there is a ‘heavy 
presumption that a contract for employment, unless otherwise expressly stated, is at-
will in nature, with duration indefinite’” (quoting E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. 
Pressman, 679 A.2d 436, 440 (Del. 1996))). 
160. The court’s holding in Riblet Products has been criticized on the basis that it 
“encourages the minority shareholder to take her chances and avoid getting her em­
ployment contract in writing.”  David A. Grooters, Express Employment Contracts in a 
Close Corporation After Nagy v. Riblet Products, Inc.: To Put Them in Writing or Not 
To Put Them in Writing, That Is the Question, 24 J. CORP. L. 123, 134 (1998).  Although 
the author does not spell out the underlying intuition, it might look like this: if a minor­
ity shareholder seeks a written employment contract from a corporation with a control­
ling shareholder, it might well contain an express at-will term, depending (of course) on 
the employee’s bargaining position.  With no written contract, if the employee is dis­
charged, the employee might be able to establish an enforceable contract on terms 
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to default-term stickiness in a relatively small set of transactional 
relationships that makes less heroic assumptions about parties’ 
likely capacity to translate, into enforceable contract terms, insights 
theoretically available to them through foresight. 
As the Wilkes doctrine evolved through application to addi­
tional fact patterns, its scope narrowed to relationships in which the 
at-will default may be especially sticky. These are typified by an 
employer of indeterminate status, high drafting costs relative to a 
risk that seems remote if it is recognized at all, and all in a setting 
that may deter explicit bargaining over explicit terms to govern ter­
mination of employment.  Consider first the indeterminate status of 
employers like Springside at the time of its founding.  Each of the 
four shareholders, now an employee and director as well as an in­
vestor, might well not perceive his new corporate employer as dis­
tinct from himself and his control over it.  In contrast, employees 
who join later “and happen to” purchase stock are much less likely 
to misunderstand that their employer’s identity and interests are 
distinct from their own. 
Indeed, although critics of the at-will doctrine emphasize its 
origins in a power imbalance between employers and employees,161 
implicit in that imbalance is employees’ awareness of it.  Participat­
ing as a corporation’s founding investor-shareholder may dull this 
awareness.  Moreover, when a cohort of employees is distinctly em­
powered, as appears to be the case with public company CEOs, the 
at-will default vanishes.  What may differentiate a start-up entity’s 
founders from CEOs of public companies is their relative aware­
ness of their employer’s identity and interests, as well as possible 
changes in the entity’s control structure over time.  CEOs, although 
much more powerful than the rank-and-file work force in obtaining 
terms of employment that they desire, appear also to understand 
the vulnerability of their positions to decisions made by the com­
pany’s board of directors.  Founding shareholders, in contrast, may 
lack this awareness or feel it much less acutely, especially if no one 
bargains from a distinctly strong initial position. 
Relatedly, as the court’s narrative of Springside’s origin sug­
gests, founders may have limited funds to invest in any tailored 
drafting and, with limits on their own time and energy, choose to 
other than at-will.  And the absence of a written contract for at-will employment would, 
at worst, have no effect on a court’s willingness to link employment status to treatment 
of the employee as an investor. 
161. See supra note 55 and text accompanying note. R 
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devote them to their new business as opposed to negotiating ex­
plicit default-ousting terms.162  If the risk of discharge from employ­
ment seems remote, more remote on the Wilkes facts than the risk 
of personal liability were the firm structured as a partnership, the 
at-will default may prove sticky.163  Moreover, perhaps a founding 
shareholder who considers the question may incorrectly assume 
that the law prohibits discharging an employee without cause! 
As discussed in Part II.C, theoretical accounts of sticky de­
faults suggest that parties may be inhibited from negotiating to oust 
a default term because they fear the adverse signals about them­
selves that may follow from raising an issue.164  In the Wilkes con­
text, the signaling story requires more complexity than the prospect 
that by demanding a just-cause standard, a would-be employee sig­
nals a propensity to shirk.  Founding investors in small corporations 
and other entities like Springside who become both employees and 
participants in the corporation’s governance have incentives not to 
shirk and thereby shortchange themselves as investors.  However, a 
founding investor who insists on a just-cause standard may signal 
undue pessimism about the future of relationships among the foun­
ders or an unwelcome suspiciousness about her co-founders. 
Thus, the alternate default rule adopted in Wilkes may reflect 
the sense that founders who propose a just-cause standard against 
an at-will default are more likely to be inhibited than are those who 
propose an at-will standard against a just-cause default, who might 
characterize the proposal as analogous to no-fault divorce and as a 
recognition that sometimes it’s better for all to call a relationship 
over, even when no one is culpable. To be sure, a founding investor 
who affirmatively proposes adopting an at-will standard may signal 
to her fellow investors a propensity for intra-corporate conspiracies 
and expulsions.  In contrast, proposing a buy-sell agreement could 
send a more benign signal, given the breadth of circumstances 
under which an initial investor may no longer be a shareholder. 
Perhaps—and this is an empirical question—in jurisdictions that 
follow Wilkes, buy-back and shareholder purchase rights are more 
162. See Harvey Gelb, Fiduciary Duties and Dissolution in the Closely Held Busi­
ness, 3 WYO. L. REV. 547, 568 (2003) (observing that at time of founding a new business 
entity, “[n]either clients nor their lawyers relished the prospects of incurring the delays 
or chilling effects of adversarial negotiations leading to the preparation of intricate legal 
documents”). 
163. See id. at 567 (observing that “[i]t is probable that in most cases involving 
closely-held businesses, the lure of limited liability and partnership tax benefits rather 
than entity governance considerations were the prime factors in choice of entity”). 
164. See supra Part II.C. 
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prevalent than are explicitly at-will employment contracts with 
shareholders.  Only with the greater purchase that data provides 
could the cross-cutting theoretical possibilities of signaling be 
untangled. 
Finally, Wilkes seems especially compelling as a solution to a 
sticky default when equity investment is not allocated in a pattern 
that creates a controlling interest that is likely to be stable over 
time.  The anti-Wilkes faction within Springside that effected his 
ouster consisted of an ad hoc alliance among the other three share­
holders.165  This alliance did not exist when Springside was founded 
and, once it emerged, it might have proved short-lived.  In contrast, 
when equity is, or has already been, allocated to create a controlling 
block of shares,166 a minority shareholder is in a position analogous 
to an employee who invests in her employer’s company, knowing of 
the power imbalance between them.  When equity is equally allo­
cated, as in Wilkes, there is no comparable imbalance and the foun­
ders are not likely “to conceive of [themselves] as plotting to use 
the employment-at-will doctrine against each other.”167  Thus, the 
at-will default may be especially sticky because putting an alterna­
tive on the agenda for discussion requires imagining how one’s co­
founders may discover and indulge their dark sides at some indeter­
minate time in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
Like much contemporary scholarship, this Article uses abstract 
theory—the sticky default thesis—both to structure how a situation 
is described and to assist in developing a normative account with 
which to evaluate the merits of a legal doctrine.168  That the default 
rule of at-will employment may be sticky in situations like Wilkes is 
a basis on which to consider the merits of the court’s replacement of 
at-will with an alternate default.  Likewise, the sticky-default thesis 
casts a different light on jurisdictions that reject Wilkes by facilitat­
165. Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 660-61 (Mass. 
1976). 
166. An example is the Rodd family block in Donahue.  Donahue v. Rodd Elec­
trotype Co., 328 N.E.2d 505, 509-10 (Mass. 1975). 
167. Gelb, supra note 162, at 567. R 
168. Even skeptics about the broader merits of particular bodies of academic the­
ory may acknowledge the value of a methodology that “yields surprises or insights 
about a familiar topic.” Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After 
Three Decades: Success or Failure, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 831 (2003). 
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ing comparative examination of underlying assumptions about pat­
terns of conduct and what is feasible in a particular setting. 
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